Introduction
The idea of a single economic and currency area is based on enabling the free flow of goods, capital and people (labour) while subject to a single currency regime. The idea deals effectively with currency risk, trade barriers, assures easy access to the labour market and provides opportunities for investing in all member states.
Full economic integration requires consideration of taxes as an important factor in the furthering of integration processes, since EU member states are tax nations, e.g. countries where budgetary incomes come primarily from taxation. EU member state tax systems are strongly diversified, due to individual developmental paths shaped by national history of various lengths, civilisational development, culture, value systems, social and economic policy, which also define the state's current financial needs. Even in a single state, taxes cannot remain neutral towards economic and social processes. Therefore, the challenge faced by EU creators was not the outright neutralisation of the impact that taxes had on the integration process, rather they worked towards limiting the negative consequences of overly diversified national tax systems. Gradual, longterm harmonisation emerged as a continent-wide process. During the development of the Treaty of Rome it was decided that, to assure a common market, it was enough to harmonise indirect taxes and remove trade barriers as they were the prime inhibitors to the flow of goods and services. The harmonisation of direct (income) taxes was not considered as they were seen as not significantly affecting the single internal market. Problems tied to direct taxation became visible as integration proceeded, the EU grew, its citizens began to migrate, multinational enterprises increased in size and scope and their financial flows (capital and profit transfers between headquarters and subsidiaries in different EU countries) became seriously affected (Mintz, 2004: 221-234) .
Because the Euro zone is relatively young and many integrative processes haven't reached their end, we can look for analogies elsewhere: of nations that have a sin-
EU Integration and Harmonisation of Personal Income Taxation
Tomasz Wołowiec 1 experiencing tax rate competition between different states (provinces) and research done on this topic is seen as extremely important for the furthering of harmonisation policies in the European Union as seen in the works of G.R. Zodrow (2003: 651-671) . It is worth mentioning that most works present controversies regarding the possibilities and need for tax system unification as well as positive and negative consequences of tax rate competition and its impact on the behaviour of individuals and firms. Nonetheless, income tax harmonisation is seen to be rather inevitable and should be understood as a natural effect of progressing unification that follows the removal of trade barriers, restrictions to the flow of capital and labour and the acceptance of a single currency. In the theory of a single economic area, virtually no work was done on income taxation, its characteristics and differentiation, variation of tax rates, rules governing tax setting and preferences. We have to know although central and eastern European states widely adopted central bank independence in the 1990s, many later baulked at meeting the Maastricht criteria and adopting the euro (Epstein and Johnson, 2010: 1237-1260).Two major issues should be pointed out about European integration:
1. Union creators assumed that income taxes will be neutral towards integration processes.
2. There will occur a natural convergence of tax systems of nations belonging to the economic and currency union (Davidson, 2007 ).
Globalization and tax competition
It is a fact that the high and increasing international mobility of capital is not only a European but also a global phenomenon, associated with the ongoing globalization process. Thus, the current tax competition issue in Europe is part of a wider question of economic policy in a constantly changing and integrating world economy. Yet in view of EMU and EU enlargement, there is a question of how the present applied regulations in the field of EU taxation could be further developed so as to, on the one hand, face the increasing pressure of globalization and tax competition, and, on the other hand, remove another obstacle to free crossborder activity in the SEM (completing thus the integration of the market) and foster economic integration in Europe. A satisfactory reply presupposes the examination of at least two issues, namely: 1) whether globalization and European economic integration are in some sense complementary or rival to each other, and; 2) whether tax competition in Europe subserves the integration or disintegration among EU states.
Although it may seem that globalization -as a process of global economic integration -includes European integration, the latter is a process of regional economic integration with objectives such as the avoidance of the "adverse effects" of globalization and international competition for members via the enlarged and more favorable economic space (which is institutionally assured), and the continuous deepening of economic integration, co-operation and socio-economic cohesion among member countries. It is obvious that, on the one hand, economic integration in Europe exhibits a much higher degree of integration and moves towards a deeper and more complete form of economic integration than the globalization process induces, and on the other hand, that the objectives of those two integration processes are quite different for a number of issues.
Particularly, this means that tax competition is not a problem for the globalization process itself, where the integration among the world's economies is much weaker. By contrast, within the European Union fiscal externalities arising from intra-EU tax competition are more significant. Furthermore, tax competition among EU states is in contrast with the objectives of European economic integration as indicated by official EU documents and treaties. The tax competition phenomenon and the recent trend of undercutting corporate tax rates in the EU have not been induced by the requirements of the European economic integration process.
It is rather the result of the general trend of falling corporate taxation in the world economy.
From the preceding discussion it should become clear that the current EU tax system -for both indirect and direct taxation -constitutes a temporary solution and it is at transitional stage. In fact, the different tax systems in the SEM create a diverse and chaotic picture in the field of EU taxation, which cannot be in accor-dance with the current state of integration. On the other hand, the response to increasing economic integration and tax competition in Europe cannot be simply tax harmonization. As emphasized by the literature, in certain cases such a development would have negative welfare effects for some members and does not fully address the fiscal aspects of the integration process.
However, it lays the foundation for closer co-operation in the tax field and paves the way for fiscal integration in the EU (Vogitzoglou, 2004: 119-125).
Differentiation of personal income taxation across the Union
Personal income taxes are strongly differentiated in EU member states in terms of setting the size of tax brack- -Setting a tax-free level of income that is offered to an unemployed spouse (e.g. in Slovakia), offered for each child being supported by the parents (e.g. Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Holland, Germany, France, Greece, Slovenia, Lithuania).
-Joint taxation of married couples (e.g. in Ireland, where we can find separate tax scales for single taxpayers and married couples).
-Specific and unique taxation of family income (France operates family quotient taxation that considers the number of children in the family).
-Constructions that permit the deduction of certain costs incurred while bringing up children (e.g. France) or even when supporting the family (e.g. Germany).
-Size and breadth of tax brackets.
-Systems defining the permissible and deductible expenses.
-Systems of preferences depending on the family's situation.
When analysing tax credits and allowable deductions present in EU member states (as subject-specific credits, deductions from tax and tax base), four main categories can be identified: So we should expect rational individuals to pursue taxbenefit-seeking mobility of labour. In reality the extensiveness of this mobility would be dependent not only on "tax wedge" levels (share that PIT and national insurance consume from gross income) but also on level of wages, gross income levels, the nature of the labour market, quality of public services and infrastructure.
Such rent-seeking tax migration would lead to increasing the supply of qualified labour in the market of the accepting country (with a competitive tax system and good labour market) while worsening the labour market situation in the country from which a worker has departed. As a result, countries keen to gain valuable workers could consider setting competitive tax rates to lure in new employees who would migrate and stay, contributing to national economic growth and pay their taxes in the accepting state. In this context harmonisation would be seen as a process of equalisation of life and employment conditions that would reduce the need for "tax wedge" oriented analyses by workers.
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Downward trend in top personal income tax rates since 1995
Currently, the top personal income tax (PIT) rate (2) amounts to 37.5%, on average, in the EU. This rate varies very substantially within the Union, ranging from a minimum of 10% in Bulgaria to a maximum of 56.4
in Sweden, as Denmark, which levied the highest PIT maximum rate until last year, has cut it to 51.5% ( Taxa 
Theoretical foundations of income tax harmonisation

Legal foundations of harmonisation
The notion of harmonising direct income taxes, es- This requires unanimous approval of all member states, which will be extremely difficult to achieve, seeing that personal income taxes are the most "political" of taxes and are a major fiscal tool for all EU nations. 2. Nations share the income from taxation in varying proportions depending on the subject of taxation (dividends, interest on savings, etc).
Rules regarding the avoidance of double taxation of income and wealth
3. Nations, on whose territory the income or wealth was created, cannot tax them (sale of shares, license fees, scholarships).
Rules regarding capital income tax
The current investor-friendly culture assures that in- 
Rules regarding taxing profits from savings
Harmonising the taxation of savings residing in bank accounts has focused on preventing any restrictions to the flow of capital between member states that could be imposed by national tax laws. The key to such harmonisation is therefore not to enforce a single tax rate for all states: every state is free to set its own taxes (level, differentiation) and profits from savings can be separated from other personal income and taxed with a separate rate or included in total incomes.
Taxing individual incomes for those not conducting business activities
The main characteristic of direct taxation is the small extent to which it has been normatively harmonised. 3. The tax is progressive and specific solutions concern different tax rates, types of scales, rules regarding progression and the size of the minimal and maximum rates. Therefore even creating a holistic and long-term understanding of existing complexities will be difficult.
Conclusions
Harmonisation in general is a difficult challenge, and any debate about harmonising PIT systems brings out major counterarguments:
1. Further loss of sovereignty in national financial policies, which will inhibit the state's ability to af- Not withstanding abovementioned criticisms, the following predictions can me made regarding income tax (primarily PIT) harmonisation across the European Union:
1. Harmonisation of direct taxes is unavoidable, but it will be a long-term process and will affect CIT before PIT (reducing complexity of trans-border business operations will be a priority compared to 7. It is important to approach with caution the concepts regarding the removal of the capital gains tax since this would promote speculative activity (due to resulting high profits), while discriminating against labour incomes and profits from (more laborious, productive and long-term) economic activity. Much more beneficial would be the removal of taxes on savings, as it would stimulate an increase in the rate of savings and make more capital available to fund economic growth.
8. It is difficult to expect that the EU will evolve into a federal state, but only such a structure would give the Union the right to set and collect taxes. The, tax policies would be formulated and implemented in a top-down manner that would allow for the implementation of a uniform (harmonised) tax system.
It is unlikely that member states will agree to such a solution, especially due to the political importance and financial role of income taxes. Therefore, we can expect that income taxes will remain decentralised, e.g. under the control of individual nations (Tanzii, Zee, 1998). The EU Commission focused on the last concept. Completed analyses indicate that EUPIT set at 10% of current national PIT rates (coupled with a matching reduction in national PIT) would provide appropriate funds to the EU. It is improbable that a EU tax will be implemented from 2014, because the decision is purely political and not economical and requires unanimous agreement by all EU member states. Considering the specifics of the PIT presented in this article, it is unlikely that the PIT will become the basic EU tax in the foreseeable future.
